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ARTICLES
Spandau Revisited: The Question of Detention for
International War Crimes
Mary Margaret Penrose*l
When we evaluate the impact of World War II war crimes
trials on reducing future atrocities, we must admit failure. 2
INTRODUCTION
Drazen Erdemovic. The name may be unfamiliar to many
outside the former Yugoslavia. The name will surely be unknown by
most people outside the international community and those committed
to the universal protection of human rights through criminal
prosecution. Drazen Erdemovic is a confessed killer. Drazen
Erdemovic has confessed to killing somewhere between seventy and
one hundred unarmed Muslims in a mass execution as a member of
the Bosnian Serb army in July 1995. 3 In this regard, he is the first
convicted defendant 4 to stem from the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established by the United Nations
in 1993. 5 He is also the first ICTY defendant to have appealed his
J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law; L.L.M., Notre Dame Law
School, Center for Civil and Human Rights; S.J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School,
Center for Civil and Human Rights.
1 In the Spring of 1999, while a student at the University of Notre Dame, I
had the opportunity to meet former Nuremberg Prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz. He gave
me an assignment that day: "Please save the world." Although it is highly unlikely that I
will ever come close to completing his assignment or effectuating his request, this article
is a step in that direction. Accordingly, this article is respectfully dedicated to Professor
Benjamin Ferencz and his motivating spirit.
2 JOHN L. GINN, SUGAMO PRISON, TOKYO 241 (1992).
3 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-96-22-
T, para. 5, Mar. 5 1998, available at U.N. website (visited Jan. 26, 2000) <http://www.un.
org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgment/erd-tsj980305e.htm> [hereinafter Second Judgment].
4 See U.N. War Crimes Court Hands Down First Sentence, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESS, Nov. 29, 1996; see also War Criminal Jailed Over Massacre, LONDON EVENING
STANDARD, Nov. 29, 1996, at 17 (reporting that Erdemovic is the first individual to be
sentenced by an international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials).
5 See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
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conviction and to have received a final judgment and sentence from
the Tribunal.6
Beyond his gruesome biography developed at Srebrenicia, Mr.
Erdemovic will also be remembered for his role as a catalyst. On
March 5, 1998, the ICTY sentenced Drazen Erdemovic to five years
in prison for committing war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.7 This
judgment was truly monumental as the ICTY would have to consider
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, May 25, 1993,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159
(1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The ICTY Statute was attached to Security Resolution
827 as an addendum.
6 Currently, there are six individuals whose ICTY convictions are pending
before the Appeals Chamber at The Hague. See generally United Nations website [U.N.
website], International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (visited Feb. 14,
2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm> (illustrating the recent conviction and
attendant forty year sentence of Goran Jelisic will undoubtedly be challenged by the
defendant on appeal as this is the harshest sentence issued to date. See Press Release 454-
e, Goran Jelisic Sentenced to 40 Years Inprisonment [sic] for Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes, Dec. 14, 1999, available at U.N. website (visited Jan. 26, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p454-e.htm> (conveying the most recent conviction
was pronounced on 14 December 1999, against Goran Jelisic). Mr. Jelisic was found
guilty on fifteen counts of crimes against humanity and sixteen counts of violations of the
laws and customs of war and has been sentenced to serve forty years imprisonment. Id.
In addition, Dusko Tadic has been sentenced to serve concurrent sentences ranging from
twenty-five to six years for his conviction on multiple counts. The most recent ruling
rendered in his case is the Trial Chamber's Sentencing Judgment following the
Prosecutor's appeal. This judgment was rendered on November 11, 1999. See Press
Release 447-e, Tadic Sentenced to 25 Years Imprisonment, Nov. 11, 1999, available at
U.N. website (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p447-e.htm>.
Also awaiting decision on appeal are Zdravko Mucic (sentenced to serve seven years),
Hazim Delic (sentenced to serve twenty years), and Esad Landzo (sentenced to serve
fifteen years), each of whom were found guilty of violations in the "Celebici" case on
October 15, 1998; Anto Furundzija, sentenced to serve ten years on December 10, 1998;
and, Zlatko Aleksovski (sentenced to serve two years), who has been released by the
Tribunal due to credit for time served. See generally Index of /icty/glance (visited Feb.
15, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/glance>. Eventually, each of these individuals will
need a permanent prison facility or institution in which to serve their respective sentences.
7 See Second Judgment, supra note 3, at para. 23. This sentence follows an
appeal invalidating the Trial Chamber's prior pronouncement that Mr. Erdemovic should
serve ten years for his crime. See generally Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing
Judgement, 1996, ICTY Case No. IT-96-22-T, Nov. 29, 1996, available at U.N. website
(visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/ udgment/erd-
tsj961129e.htm> [hereinafter First Judgment].
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for the first time since its inception precisely where it would send a
prisoner to serve his final sentence.8 Such decision had not been
contemplated by an international tribunal since the vanquished
defendants of World War II were housed in the Spandau and Sugamo
prison facilities located in the home countries of each of the World
War II defendants.9  In fact, at the time Drazen Erdemovic was
sentenced, only two countries (Italy and Finland)10 had reached
agreement with the Tribunal enabling ICTY prisoners to be
incarcerated outside the detention facilities of the Hague."
l
8 The selected place for incarceration does not appear in Erdemovic's
Sentencing Judgment. See generally Second Judgment, supra note 3.
9 Unlike the World War II Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, each of which
were conducted following the War in the occupied territories of the victorious Allies, the
seat of the ICTY is The Hague, Netherlands - far outside the continuing Yugoslavian
conflict. Further, the ICTY is not permitted to place convicted defendants in prisons
located in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The language of'Article 27 of the ICTY
Statute implicitly precludes imprisonment in any former Yugoslavian territory. To the
extent that any ambiguity exists, however, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
confirmed that Yugoslavian prisons were unacceptable given the nature of the crimes in
question and the international character of the Tribunal. See JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
AND RWANDA 116 (1997). The Tribunal has also expressed reservations about sentencing
any ICTY defendant to a Yugoslavian facility. See First Judgment, supra note 7, at
paragraph 70 (unequivocally indicating that "the Trial Chamber shares the view of the
Secretary-General that [ICTY] sentences should be served outside the territory of the
former Yugoslavia: . . because of the situation prevailing in that region, it would not be
possible to ensure the security of the convicted person or the full respect of a decision of
the International Tribunal in that regard.").
1o See Press Release 382, infra note 12.
l"The 1997 Official Report of the ICTY indicates that ten States have
"indicated their willingness" to enforce sentences of the Tribunal. These States include
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Italy, Norway, Pakistan and Sweden. In addition to those offering support, ten other
States have indicated that they are unable to accept prisoners from the ICTY. The
unavailable States are the Bahamas, Belarus, Belize, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, France,
Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Poland and Slovenia. See Report of the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991,
U.N. Doc. S/1997/729, Sept.18, 1997, at 27, U.N. website (visited Feb. 14, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/icty/rapport4-e.htm>. Several States, however, have expressed their
agreement to receive prisoners only with reservations. See War Criminal Jailed Over
Massacre, supra note 4, at 17 (indicating that Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain
and Sweden have all agreed to take ICTY prisoners "with reservations"). Finland has
stated that it will not accept political leaders or high-ranking officials who might require
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Thereafter, Norway and Sweden, in April 1998, and February 1999,
respectively, 12 joined Italy and Finland as possible hosts for ICTY
prisoners.
13
In the pages that follow, the question of detention as it relates
to the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR") 14  and the forthcoming International Criminal Court
("ICC")'5 will be addressed. As these tribunals continue to hand
down guilty verdicts and accompanying sentences, the issue of
detention can no longer be avoided or delayed. To date, the ICTY has
issued twenty-five public indictments implicating sixty-six individual
defendants, 16 supervised the arrest and detention of forty individuals, '7
and convicted seven men with potential sentences ranging from two
and one half to forty years. 18  Likewise, twenty-eight public
extraordinary security. See Finland Ready to Receive Yugoslavia War Criminals,
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, May 9, 1997. Sweden has indicated that it will only accept
ICTY prisoners who are Swedish citizens or long-standing Swedish residents. See
Finnish Prisoners to Take in Five Convicted War Criminals, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS,
April 24, 1996.
12 See generally Press Release 382, Sweden to Become the Fourth State to
Sign an Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences, Feb. 18, 1999, available at U.N.
website (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/presseal/p382-e.htm>.
"3 Id. Italy was the first State to reach agreement with the Tribunal regarding
the enforcement of sentences on February 6, 1997. Finland followed Italy by proffering
its prison facilities to the ICTY on May 7, 1997. Id.
14 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, Sess., Nov. 8, 1994, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1612 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The
ICTR Statute was attached to Security Resolution 955 as an addendum.
15 See Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
16 See U.N. website (visited Jan. 26, 2000) <http://www.un.org.icty/glance/
list3.htm> [hereinafter list3].
17 id.
18 As stated above, the case of Drazen Erdemovic remains the only final
judgment issued by the ICTY in nearly seven years of operation. He was sentenced by
the Court to five years in prison on 5 March 1998, following a successful appeal
challenging his prior sentence and conviction. See Second Judgment, supra note 3.
Most recently, Goran Jelisic reveived a forty year sentence that he will likely challenge on
appeal. See Press Release 454-e, supra note 6. Also, Dusko Tadic received an increase in
sentence from twenty years imprisonment to twenty-five years imprisonment on 11
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indictments have been issued by the ICTR against forty-eight
individuals.' 9 As of December, 1999, thirty-eight individuals remain
in ICTR custody at the temporary United Nations detention facility in
the Arusha prison. 20 And, the ICTR has issued guilty verdicts against
five separate defendants with pronounced sentences ranging from
fifteen years to life imprisonment.
2 1
Through sheer necessity - the impetus having been provided
by Erdemovic ---: the international community that has maintained and
supported these war crimes Tribunals must now come together to
determine where these individuals will serve their respective
sentences once convicted. The legitimacy of the ICTY and ICTR
requires that the issue of detention be as fully considered and as fairly
implemented as every other procedural and evidentiary issue
previously addressed by these Tribunals. Their much-anticipated
successor institution, the ICC, will be waiting, watching and looking
for guidance. Their predecessors, the Nuremberg22 and Tokyo Trials
23
are but a distant memory - still plaguing the international community
with claims of "victors' justice," 24 imperfect sentencing and partisan
November 1997, following a full trial and appeal by the Prosecutor. Id. Mr. Tadic has
appealed this increase in sentence. Because his case remains pending on appeal, Mr.
Tadic has not been transferred from the ICTY's holding facility at the Scheveningen
prison at The Hague. Id. Further, because the remaining convicted defendants have cases
pending on appeal, they too remain at the ICTY holding facility at The Hague. Id. See
list3 supra note 16.
19 ICTR website (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/
factsheets/factsee.htm>.
20 Id. One additional ICTR defendant remains incarcerated by United States
government officials in Texas.
21 Id. In stark contrast to the ICTY sentencing practices, three ICTR
defendants have thus far been condemned to life in prison. These individuals are Jean-
Paul Akayesu (convicted of genocide), Jean Kambanda (pled guilty to genocide), and
Clement Kayishema (convicted of genocide). The two remaining sentences are against
Obed Ruzindana (sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for genocide) and Omar
Serushago (sentenced to fifteen years for crimes against humanity). Each of these
convictions and resulting sentences remains pending on appeal.
22 See I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, GERMANY (14 Nov. 1945-1 OCT. 1946), 10 (1947).
23 See generally THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (R. John Pritchard et al. eds.,
1981) (collecting many of the documents from the Tokyo Trials which occurred between
April 24, 1946 and November 12, 1948).
24 See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE
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politics.
2 5
The time has come for detention decisions in international
criminal law. We are on the verge of a new millennium. Finally, the
world community has concrete plans for a permanent international
criminal court. And yet, we have no idea, no plans and certainly no
existing blueprint for precisely where we intend to incarcerate the
individuals that we, as an international community, convict. Drazen
Erdemovic, a name unfortunately relegated to historic significance,
has forced the issue.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICTY AND ICTR
On February 22, 1993, the Security Council of the United
Nations decided that the establishment of an international tribunal was
necessary "for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.,,26 This Resolution, commonly
referred to as Resolution 808, provided the Secretary-General no more
than sixty days to present the Security Council with "a report on all
aspects of this matter, including specific proposals." 27
Thereafter, on May 25, 1993, the Security Council adopted a
second Resolution, Resolution 827, providing specific proposals for
the establishment of the ICTY.28 Acting under Chapter VII of the
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 332 (1994) (stating
that "[a] primary criticism of Nuremberg was that it amounted to victors' justice since the
tribunal was composed exclusively of prosecutors and judges from the victorious
countries and the defendants were limited to Germans, even though the allied personnel
also committed serious violations of humanitarian law during the war. The International
Tribunal, in contrast, was created neither by the victors nor by the parties involved in the
conflict, but rather by the United Nations, representing the international community of
States.").
25 See THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 23, at 1. "Like its
Nuremberg counterpart, the Tokyo War Crimes Trial was a product of the highly-charged
emotional atmosphere of its time ... [t]he Trial itself has been a subject for considerable
controversy. The procedure, rulings and findings of the Court have been called into
question by later generations." Id.26 See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
271d.
28 See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
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Charter of the United Nations in both instances, the Security Council
officially called upon all States to "co-operate fully with [these]
International Tribunal[s] and [their] organs in accordance with the
present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal. 29
This mandate further required all States to "take any measures
necessary under their domestic law to implement the proviso of the
present resolution and the Statute. 3 °
Approximately eighteen months later, the Security Council
was again moved to formally respond to international war crimes and
crimes against humanity. 31 This time, the impetus was a rapid and
decimating genocidal campaign where nearly one million Rwandan
citizens perished in a span of one hundred days. 32 The purpose of this
second ad hoc body was also to restore peace and order to the country
through criminal prosecutions.33
With the development of the ICTR, the international
community would witness the creation of the first two international
war crimes Tribunals since Nuremberg and Tokyo. These modem
creations, however, have the enviable task of importing justice back to
the war-torn countries they purportedly represent as neither Tribunal
is located within the territory where the conflict and crimes
29 Id.
30 id.
31 See Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case
of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 353 (1997).
32 See generally PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH To INFORM You THAT
TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998).
Decimation means the killing of every tenth person in a
population and in the spring and early summer of 1994 a
program of massacres decimated the Republic of Rwanda.
Although the killing was low-tech - performed largely by
machete - it was carried out at dazzling speed: of an
original population of about seven and a half million, at
least eight hundred thousand people were killed in just a
hundred days. Rwandans often speak of a million deaths,
and they may be right. The dead of Rwanda accumulated at
nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the
Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Id. at unnumbered page prefacing p. 5.
33 See generally Morris, supra note 31.
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occurred.34 Instead, the international community has agreed "to
cooperate" from a comfortable distance by conveying a message to
both venues that war crimes remain intolerable and will expose the
perpetrators to criminal sanctions.
This issue of cooperation becomes crucial when considering
the question of detention. For with the issuance of these two
Resolutions, the world community would move ever closer to the
realization of a permanent system of enforceable international
criminal law. These new judicial institutions, however, differ from
their predecessor bodies at Nuremberg and Tokyo in several important
respects.
First, because the ICTY was established prior to the cessation
of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia and under the guise of Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, Articles 39 and 41, the tribunal is
considered a vehicle to help "maintain and re-establish international
peace and security.' '35 Similarly, although the ICTR was established
after the Rwandan genocide was complete, many of the individuals
responsible for these crimes have fled to neighboring countries where
the international community has no physical presence or juridical
personality.36 Because both institutions originated from the Security
Council under Chapter VII, they should be immune from the many
34 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-
Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 11 (1997). Professor Bassiouni challenges that "Arusha (Tanzania) is not
the ideal place for locating the [ICTR], since there too, the U.N. had to build the
Tribunal's infrastructure from scratch under trying circumstances." Id. at 49.
35 See KARINE LESCURE & FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 6 (1996). "In affirming that the situation generated by the
virtually systematic breaches of international humanitarian law in former Yugoslavia
constituted a threat to international peace and security under the terms of Article 39 of
Chapter VII, the Security Council provided itself with the means to apply Article 41 of
the same chapter. This article enables it, in such a situation, to take adequate measures
not involving the use of armed force. The measures actually quoted are of an economic
nature (complete or partial rupture of economic ties and rail, sea and air links, etc.), but
this is not exclusively the case because Article 41 also envisages the breaking of
diplomatic relations. Although the creation of a criminal jurisdiction may seem very far
removed from such measures, the formulation of the second sentence in Article 41 "these
may include" clearly shows the exemplary and non-restrictive nature of the list." Id.
36 See generally Mary M. Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of
Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (1999).
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criticisms levied against the World War II Tribunals.37 In fact, two
scholars have suggested that this unique creation provides the ICTY
and ICTR "with both eminently international and political
credibility.,
38
The second main distinction between the modern international
Tribunals and the World War II bodies is that the range of penalties
set forth in both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes explicitly preclude the
imposition of the death penalty.39 The ICC has likewise adopted the
modern approach and also limits punishment to terms of
imprisonment and the possible imposition of fines.40 The abolition of
the death penalty, by necessity, mandates that a system for detention
be established to house individuals convicted of international crimes.4'
37 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 24, at 332; MICHAEL P. SCHARF,
BALKAN JUSTICE 11 (1997) (stating that "[t]hese criticisms are not without foundation. It
was true, for example, that only victorious states were represented on the Nuremberg
Tribunal. Many commentators have criticized the Allies' failure to appoint a judge from
a neutral country or from Germany.... In addition, the states that tried the Nuremberg
defendants were guilty of many of the same crimes for which they convicted and hung
their former adversaries."); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 201 (1996). "The
Tribunal, then, was not established by a military victor to judge the defeated party's or
parties' nationals. Instead, acting on behalf of the world community, the [Security
Council] established the Tribunal to judge all parties to the conflict who committed
violations of well-established international criminal law." Id.
38 See LESCURE & TRINTIGNAC, supra note 35, at 3-4 (stating that "[i]n the
case of the Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, the community of nations, through the
Security Council, the main restraining body of the United Nations Organization (UNO)
was behind its creation, which provides it with both eminently international and political
credentials. This international dimension will certainly enable the Tribunal and its
members not to be exposed to the criticism expressed concerning the Nuremberg Tribunal
according to which the justice then rendered was that of the victors").
39 The death penalty was a regularly exercised option both at Nuremberg and
Tokyo. Of the twenty-five men convicted at Tokyo, seven received the death penalty.
RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 31 (1971).
Likewise, eleven defendants at Nuremberg were sentenced to death by hanging. TELFORD
TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 598-99 (1992). Ironically, the main
complaint by defendants regarding the death penalty seemed to be the manner of death
imposed - hanging as opposed to the utilization of a firing squad. As the Nuremberg
defendants challenged, a soldier was entitled to the more honorable death by firing squad.
Id. at 601-02.
40 See infra note 47 (setting forth the full text of the Rome Statute's Article
77, which delimits the possible range of penalty for individuals convicted by the ICC).
4 1 Because the victors during World War I still occupied the territories
562 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI
One of the more unique aspects of the ICTY, which differs
both from the World War II tribunals and from its sister court, the
ICTR, is that the ICTY statute seemingly prohibits persons convicted
by the Court from being incarcerated within the former Balkan
States.42 This nuance will require greater cooperation from the
community of nations and, likewise, greater care and creativity in
addressing the detention dilemma. Spandau43 and Sugamo44 are
merely historical relics reminiscent of an earlier approach to
international criminal law.
wherein the criminal proceedings were conducted, they were able to find a single prison
facility for each of the two Tribunals in which to detain prisoners. The Spandau prison
facility, which was situated in the British-controlled sector of West Berlin, was the sole
place of detention for individual defendants convicted by the Nuremberg Trial and
sentenced to prison sentence. TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 615. The Tokyo prisoners were
detained in the Sugamo prison facility located just outside the downtown area of Tokyo.
GINN, supra note 2, at 1-1 1.
42 Article 27 of the ICTY Statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
Enforcement of Sentences
Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the
International Tribunal from a list of States which have
indicated their willingness accept convicted persons. Such
imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable
law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision of the
International Tribunal.
ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 27. See also LESCURE & TRINTIGNAC, supra note 35, at
76 (stating that "[t]he States of [the] former Yugoslavia would not appear to be among
those liable to be asked to carry out the sentences").
43 See TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 615. When the ninety-three year-old Rudolf
Hess committed suicide in 1987, Spandau's final resident completed his life sentence.
Immediately following the death of Hess, the prison was destroyed "so that it would not
become a historical attraction." Id. at 618.
44 See GINN, supra note 2, at 1.
Sugamo Prison no longer exists except in official American
and Japanese records, and in the memories of those who
served time there as prisoners or guards. In its place now is
a very expensive housing and shopping complex named
Sunshine City, the location of the tallest building in Japan.
In one comer of the complex is a small park where a large
stone marks the location of the prison's gallows. A
message in Japanese reads "pray for eternal peace."
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II. ICTY STATUTE AND RULES REGARDING DETENTION
Article 24 of the ICTY Statute provides in pertinent part that
"[t]he penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to
imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial
Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia., 45 Article 23 of the
ICTR Statute essentially mirrors the language of its sister institution in
providing that "[t]he penalty imposed shall be limited to
imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial
Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of Rwanda. ' 4 6  This limitation regarding
punishment clearly distinguishes the modem ad hoc Tribunals and the
forthcoming ICC47 from the previous juridical bodies at Nuremberg
and Tokyo.
A combined total of eighteen death sentences were
45 See ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 24 (emphasis added).
46 See ICTR Statute, supra note 14, at art. 23(1).
47 Id. Article 77 of the Rome Statue provides in pertinent part as follows:
Applicable Penalties
1. Subject to article 110, the Court may impose on of the
following penalties on a person convicted of a crime under
article 5 of this Statute:
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years,
which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; or
(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by
the extreme gravity of the crime and the
individual circumstances of the convicted person.
2. In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets
derived directly or indirectly from that crime,
without prejudice to the rights of the bona fide
third parties.
Rome Statue, supra note 15, at Part 7, art. 77 (emphasis added). It is apparent that the
modem approach to international criminal law limits the possible range of penalty to
terms of imprisonment. While this approach to criminal justice is severely limited, and
indeed limiting, this article does not provide sufficient space to properly address this
issue. It is sufficient for the purposes of this piece that readers understand the connection
between penalties of imprisonment and the consequential need for places of confinement.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
pronounced against the Major War Criminals following World War II.
Seven of the Major Tokyo War Criminals received the death penalty48
including: Kenji Doihara, Koki Hirota, Seishiro Itagaki, Heitaro
Kimura, Iwane Matsui, Akira Muto, and Hideki Tojo.49  The
Nuremberg Tribunal more generously resorted to capital punishment
as twelve of the twenty-two Major Nuremberg War Criminals were
sentenced to hang.50 However, only eleven of the Nuremberg death
sentences were carried out as Martin Bormann, who was tried in
absentia and found guilty, was never captured by the Tribunal and
thereby avoided the fate suffered by his compatriots. 51 The eleven
Nuremberg defendants executed by the Tribunal were Hermann
Goring, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Alfred Jodl, Alfred
Rosenberg, Wilhelm Frick, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Fritz Sauckel, Ernst
Kaltenbrunner, Hans Frank, and Julius Streicher.52
Despite the option of the death penalty at each of the World
War II Tribunals, there were still several prison sentences handed
down at both Nuremberg and Tokyo. The Tokyo tribunal issued
eighteen prison sentences against the Major War Criminals, sixteen of
which were originally set as life sentences.53 In contrast, only seven
of the Major Nuremberg War Criminals received prison sentences in
lieu of death.54 Not a single Tokyo defendant imprisoned at Sugamo
actually served his life sentence "unless he died of natural causes
within a very few years. They were all paroled and pardoned by
48 See GINN, supra note 2, at 122.4 91d. at 136-37.
50 See MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945-
1946: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 261 (1997).
51 Id.
52 id.
53 See MINEAR, supra note 39, at 172 (reporting that "[s]ix of these men died
in prison. The other twelve served only part of their sentences"). Life sentences were
pronounced against the following individuals: Sadao Araki, Kingoro Hashimoto,
Shunroku Hata, Kiichiro Hiranuma, Naoki Hoshino, Okinori Kaya, Koichi Kido, Kuniaki
Koiso, Jiro Minami, Takasumi Oka, Hiroshi Oshima, Kenro Sato, Shigetaro Shimada,
Toshio Shiratori, Teiichi Suzuki and Yoshijiro Umenzu. GINN, supra, note 2, at 136-37.
One of the Major War Criminals, Shigenori Togo, received a sentence of twenty years
imprisonment. Id. And, the lightest sentence of seven years was issued against Mamoru
Shigemitsu. Id.
54 See MARRUS, supra note 50, at 261.
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1958. ' 55
Similarly, several of the Nuremberg defendants sentenced to
the Spandau facility 56 were released prior to the expiration of their
respective sentences. 57  The sentencing and detention precedents
established at Nuremberg and Tokyo, however, are of limited
assistance to the modem endeavors.58 Unlike the current Tribunals,
the prisoners of Nuremberg and Tokyo were each sentenced
contemporaneously with their compatriots and served their entire
sentences with one another in a single detention facility.59 In addition,
the enforcement of Nuremberg sentences was overseen by the
victorious Allies on a rotating cycle,6 ° while the United States Army
was put in charge of the Sugamo prison facility.61 Once the sentences
were issued, the Tribunals were no longer maintained to oversee to the
55 See GINN, supra note 2, at 242.
56 In contrast to the sentencing practices at Tokyo, only three of the Major
War Criminals at Nuremberg were sentenced to life in prison: Erich Raeder, Walther
Funk and Rudolf Hess. See MARRUS, supra note 50, at 261. In addition, two defendants
received sentences of twenty years: Albert Speer and Baldur von Schirach. See id One
defendant, Constantin von Neurath, received a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment
while another, Karl Donitz, was sentenced to serve ten years. Id. Unlike the Major War
Criminals at Tokyo, where all defendants were found guilty on at least one count, three of
the Major War Criminals at Nuremberg were acquitted on all charges. The acquitted
individuals were Hans Fritzsche, Franz von Papen and Hjalmar Schacht. Id.
57 See generally TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 616-18. See MARRUS, supra note
50, at 258-59 (reporting that Rudolf Hess, one of the few defendants who served his full
life sentence, committed suicide in the Spandau prison facility at the age of 93).
58 A similar observation has been made regarding the two ad hoc Tribunals.
See Daniel B. Pickard, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal
Court, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123 (1997). "The Yugoslavian and the Rwandan
Tribunals were not helpful in establishing specific sentencing guidelines for the proposed
ICC. The did, however, espouse general sentencing principles, including a resistance
against capital punishment." Id.
59 As indicated in the text, supra, each of the Nuremberg defendants was sent
to the renowned Spandau prison in West Berlin. See TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 615.
Similarly, the Tokyo defendants all served their respective sentences under the watchful
eye of the U.S. Eighth Army at Sugamo Prison in Tokyo. See MNEAR, supra note 39, at
174. It was not until the end of the Allied Occupation in 1952 that the Japanese
Government was given limited authority over the Tokyo prisoners. Id.
60 See TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 615. "With the arrival of the prisoners [at
Spandau] it became an international penitentiary, ultimately under the Control Council,
but administered in monthly sequence by Russian, American, British and French military
officers."
61 See GINN, supra note 2, at 1-11.
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enforcement of the sentences.
In contrast to the World War II bodies, the enforcement of
ICTY and ICTR sentences will be governed continuously by both the
Tribunal and the host State wherein the prisoner is ultimately
incarcerated.62 This nuance will likely cause difficulty at a later point
when the two ad hoc bodies disband. No provision currently exists in
either Statute indicating who or what institution will oversee the
enforcement of sentences once the Tribunals complete their work.63
Article 27 of the ICTY Statute provides that "[i]mprisonment
shall be served in a State designated by the International Tribunal
from a list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their
willingness to accept convicted persons. Such imprisonment shall be
in accordance with the applicable law of the State concerned, subject
to the supervision of the International Tribunal.,64  Article 27 is
complemented by Rule 103 of the Tribunal which provides as follows:
"[i]mprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Tribunal
from a list of States which have indicated their willingness to accept
convicted persons. 65
The only distinction between Article 27 of the ICTY Statute
and Article 26 of the ICTR Statute is that the Rwandan Tribunal and
accompanying Statute explicitly permits the domestic enforcement of
sentences within Rwanda. 66 This provision leads to a curious result.
62 See ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 27; see also ICTR Statute, supra
note 14.
63 See ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 27; see also ICTR Statute, supra
note 14, at art. 26.
64 See ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 27 (emphasis added).
65 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Oct. 6, 1995, U.N.
Doc. IT/32 Rev. 6.
66 ICTR Statute art. 26 provides as follows:
Enforcement of Sentences
Imprisonment shall be served in Rwanda or any of the
States on a list of States which have indicated to the
Security Council their willingness to accept convicted
persons, as designated by the International Tribunal for
Rwanda. Such imprisonment shall be in accordance with
the applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the
supervision of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.
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Unlike the territories of the former Yugoslavia, the Rwandan justice
system was wholly destroyed during the genocide campaign. The few
prisons that exist in Rwanda are overflowing with domestic prisoners
accused of committing or otherwise participating in genocide.67
Whereas the Yugoslavian prisons most likely present a theoretical
barrier to domestic imprisonment, the Rwandan prisons present
legitimate practical obstacles to domestic imprisonment. 68 And, to the
extent that the Secretary-General had concerns relating to the
Yugoslavian situation, those same concerns would certainly exist in
relation to the Rwanda. One would suspect that this provision is
merely part of a program of political appeasement to the Rwandan
government who, ironically, cast the only negative vote on the
Security Council against the creation of the ICTR.6 9
The provisions relating to imprisonment by "willing states"
will invariably lead to distinctions in treatment between ICTY and
ICTR prisoners depending on the host country that accepts the
prisoner. For example, prison life in Sweden or Norway is most likely
preferable to prison life in the United States or many of the African
and Middle-Eastern countries.7 0  This is true not only because the
ICTR Statute, supra note 14, at art. 26.
67 See Morris, supra note 31, at 357. Due to internal conditions in Rwanda, it
is difficult to discern the precise number of individuals being held domestically on
charges of genocide and complicity in genocide. Professor Morris observes the breadth
of this problem by discussing the "enormous problem" Rwanda must face domestically
"of how to handle the other 90,000-plus criminal cases arising from the Rwandan
genocide." See id.
68 Cf Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region
of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, 7 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 325 (1997). Akhavan observes that "[w]ith its very limited
resources, the International Tribunal cannot even attempt to replace the role of Rwandan
national courts in delivering fair trials to the approximately 85,000 persons presently
detained.... [I]t is only the Rwandan courts that can attempt to deliver justice to the tens
of thousands languishing in overcrowded prisons." See id. at 339.
69 See Penrose, supra note 36.
70 Circumstantial evidence regarding the distinctions between prison life in
these world regions can be garnered from Amnesty International's 1999 World Report
available at the Amnesty International website, http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/
ar99/index.html. While there are numerous entries for Middle Eastern and African
countries, there are no entries for Iceland or Norway and only minor complaints raised
against Finland, Denmark and Sweden. In contrast, see generally the reports involving
Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Id. Also of interest is the harsh criticism levied against
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European and Scandinavian countries maintain much more liberal
sentencing and detention practices, but also because the parole and
commutation laws in these countries are more generous than their
non-European counterparts - including the United States.71
A second consideration should be the ease of travel and access
for the friends, relatives and counsel of each imprisoned individual.72
The Tribunals should consider the difficulty that prisoners will have in
contacting and maintaining communications between themselves and
those persons most capable of proffering them assistance. And, in the
case of counsel, the Tribunal must consider the difficulty in accessing
the prisoner once he or she is sent to a distant land. From a practical
perspective, ease of access across Europe is very different from the
burden of traveling across and throughout Africa. Considerations of
access and difficulty in reaching a particular inmate cannot (and
should not) be underscored - particularly from a human rights
perspective.
Morris and Scharf observe that because the sentences imposed
by the ICTY are to be served in the facilities of States outside the
former Yugoslavia, "[t]here may be hardships when a person
convicted of a crime is required to serve his sentence in a foreign
country resulting from linguistic differences, cultural differences, or
less frequent family visitation due to distance." 73 To account for this
dilemma, the solution proffered is that certain factors should be
considered before determining where a particular ICTY prisoner is
sent for incarceration.
74
Factors that should be considered include "the proximity of a
State to the former Yugoslavia, the unquestionable neutrality of a
State with regard to the Yugoslav conflict, the necessary security
United States' prisons. Id.
71 See infra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
72 William A. Schabas, Sentencing By International Tribunals: A Human
Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461, 494 (1997) (acknowledging that
international prisoners will "be isolated from their families and probably from other
support systems. They may find themselves in relative isolation, in a culturally
unfamiliar environment, and unable to communicate and socialize with fellow inmates
and prison personnel.").
73 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 24, at 304.
74 id.
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arrangements, international standards regarding the treatment of
prisoners, the possibility of pardon or commutation under national
law, the cost of incarceration in a State and the ability of a State to
bear such cost., 75 Although these factors were annunciated before the
ICTY or ICTR had tried or convicted any defendant, they remain
viable considerations when imposing and enforcing an international
criminal sentence. With the hopeful advent of a permanent
international institution in the ICC, these consideration must be more
fully explored, considered and ultimately, precisely defined.
In addition to those factors set forth by Morris and Scharf, the
following concerns should also be evaluated in determining the
placement of international prisoners under the current system: past
human rights abuses by the receiving State, ease of access to State
prisons by the International Community or a representative thereof
(such as the International Committee of the Red Cross), ease of access
for counsel, family and friends, the immigration laws of the host State
to the extent such laws affect family relations and visitations, the
political stability of the receiving State, and, common languages (if
any) of the host State and prisoner.76
The ICTY Trial Chamber articulated concerns of its own
regarding sentencing and imprisonment in the Erdemovic case. In the
first Sentencing Judgment, the Court noted that "because persons
found guilty will be obliged to serve their sentences in institutions
which are often far from their places of origin, the Trial Chamber
takes note of the inevitable isolation into which [such prisoners] will
have been placed. Moreover, cultural and linguistic differences will
distinguish them from the other detainees." 77 The Erdemovic decision
clearly requires that accepting States be signatories to the major
human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the
European Convention on Human Rights, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 8 Additional considerations included
I d. at 305.
76 Many of the people of the former Yugoslavia share a common language,
Serbo-Croatian. SCHARF, supra note 37, at 21. In contrast, the main regional language
for ICTR defendants is reported to be Kinyarwanda. Akhaven, supra note 68, at 342.
77 First Judgement, supra note 7, at para. 75.
78 Id. at para. 74.
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concern for human rights through adherence to the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and
numerous regional instruments relating to protective rules for persons
under any form of detention or imprisonment. 79
To date, the dilemma regarding enforcement of sentences has
focused less on the practical arrangements relating conditions of
confinement and more on the problems relating simply to securing
agreements from willing States to host ICTY and ICTR prisoners.
The Honorable Gabrielle Kirk McDonald recently called for support
from the international community while delivering a speech at
American University in Washington, D.C.80  Judge McDonald
explained that "the nature of the modern State and its place in the
international community means that it is the States who are expected,
in fact required, to provide the structured and systematic support
necessary to sustain the Tribunal." 81  More specifically, Judge
McDonald spoke to the urgent issue of detention as follows:
The second type of cooperation required, and one that
is currently the most pressing, concerns the
enforcement of sentences imposed by the Tribunal. A
further consequence of our lack of territory is the
absence of a facility for the incarceration of persons
convicted by the Tribunal. We have no prisons.
Under Article 27 of our statute, States may express a
willingness to accept persons who have been
convicted. The legal character of the Tribunal and the
national penal systems is such that it is necessary to
regulate the imprisonment process through
enforcement agreements concluded between the
Tribunal and the State concerned. The urgency of this
matter, that is the need for enforcement agreements, is
best illustrated by a few figures. As I have stated, we
79 Id. at para. 74.
80 Judge McDonald joined many other notable International scholars and
jurists at a conference entitled, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects.
The conference took place at American University on March 31 and April 1, 1998.
81 The Honorable Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1413, 1426 (1998).
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have twenty-three indictees in custody. Over the
coming months, and years, we will complete their
trials and appeals and may then face a situation where
we have more convicted persons than there are States
that have agreed to enforce their prison sentences. As
we expect to obtain custody of more accused persons,
this deficiency will become even more critical.
82
Despite this plea by the former President of the ICTY, there
remain only four willing States (Italy, Finland, Norway and, most
recently, Sweden) that have officially agreed to accept ICTY
prisoners. 3 In comparison, only two African States (Mali and Benin)
have agreed to accept ICTR defendants upon conviction. 84 Curiously,
all of the ICTY-aligned States are concentrated in the Western
European region while the ICTR States are confined to the African
continent. Of these six "willing states," only one of them, Norway,
has actually received a prisoner. In August, 1998, Drazen Erdemovic
82 Id. at 1426-27. The more recent figures quoted supra in this Article
indicate that twenty-five public indictments have been issued by the Court implicating
sixty-six individual defendants and resulting in the arrest and detention of forty
individuals. See sources cited supra notes 16-18.
83 The 1997 Official Report of the ICTY indicates that ten States have
"indicated their willingness" to enforce sentences of the Tribunal. These States include
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Italy, Norway, Pakistan and Sweden. In addition to those offering support, ten other
States have indicated that they are unable to accept prisoners from the ICTY. The
unavailable States are the Bahamas, Belarus, Belize, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, France,
Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Poland and Slovenia. Report of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991,
U.N. General Assembly, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 49, at Part IIIV, U.N. doc. A/52/375
(1997). Several States, however, have expressed their agreement to receive prisoners
only with reservations. See War Criminal Jailed Over Massacre, LONDON EVENING
STANDARD, Nov. 29, 1996, at 17 (indicating that Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands,
Spain and Sweden have all agreed to take ICTY prisoners "with reservations"). Finland
has stated that it will not accept political leaders or high-ranking officials who might
require extraordinary security. See Finland Ready to Receive Yugoslavia War Criminals,
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, May 9, 1997. Sweden has indicated that it will only accept
ICTY prisoners who are Swedish citizens or long-standing Swedish residents. See
Finnish Prisoners to Take in Five Convicted War Criminals, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS,
April 24, 1996.84See generally ICTR website (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.ictr.org>.
This information can be gleaned from the ICTR fact sheet, which is updated regularly.
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was transferred to Norway to begin serving his five (5) year
sentence.
85
III. WILLING STATES
Due to the structure of the ICTY and ICTR, both institutions
must rely on "willing states" to assist in the enforcement of criminal
sentences.86 The United Nations does not maintain any permanent
or international prison facility. Rather, the task of actual
enforcement of ICTY and ICTR sentences is delegated to
individual countries that may have no nexus to or interest in the
underlying hostilities that served to create these juridical bodies.87
In over six years of independent operation, the two ad hoc
bodies have been notably unsuccessful in securing "willing states" to
host ICTY and ICTR prisoners.88 Currently, as noted above, there is a
clear regional (or perhaps cultural) demarcation between the "willing
states" of Western Europe and those of Africa. Yet, despite the
futility experienced by these modem Tribunals, the ICC has similarly
relegated the task of enforcing sentences to "willing states."
Article 103 of the Rome Statute states that "[a] sentence of
imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from
a list of States which have indicated to the Court their willingness to
accept sentenced persons." 89  The Rome Statute does appear,
however, to at least anticipate shortcomings similar to those evidenced
by the ICTY and ICTR as Article 103 further provides that "[i]f no
State is designated under paragraph 1, the sentence of imprisonment
shall be served in a prison facility made available by the host State."9 °
As the ICC becomes more than merely an intellectual exercise
85 See generally ICTY website (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.un.icty.
org>.
86 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
87 See ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 27. See also ICTR Statute, supra
note 14, art. 26.
88 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
89 Rome Statute, supra note 15, at Part 10, art. 103(1)(a) (emphasis added).
90 Id. at Part 10, art. 103(4). The host State for the ICC has been designated as
The Hague, Netherlands. Id. at Part 1, art. 3.
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and a distant panacea, 91 it is imperative that we move beyond the
concept of "willing states." To date, this system has proven wholly
ineffective. 92 And, while it may not be possible at this point to rewrite
or redraft the ICC Statute, it is possible to place increasing pressure on
States to assist with the enforcement of international criminal law.
The United Nations Security Council certainly possesses the ability to
enforce sanctions against recalcitrant States when provided with
sufficient motivation to act. A truly international system of criminal
law cannot be dependent on a few select countries to carry out its
mandate. 93  Rather, the willingness of States to cooperate with the
existing Tribunals and the forthcoming ICC must develop in a more
tangible measure. The status quo is simply unacceptable.
IV. ITALY, FINLAND, NORWAY, SWEDEN, MALI AND BENIN
Italy was the first State to reach agreement with the ICTY
regarding the enforcement of ICTY sentences.94 On February 6, 1997,
nearly four years after the creation of the Tribunal, Italy signed an
agreement with the Tribunal affirming its availability and cooperation
under Article 27. This agreement seemed particularly welcoming
based in part on the proximity of Italy to the Balkan region.
91 As of February 7, 2000, ninety-four States have become signatories to the
ICC. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights' website (visited Feb. 28, 2000)
<http://www.LCHR.org/feature/50thsigs.htm>. More importantly, however, only five
States have thus far ratified the Rome Statute. Id. This number falls well short of the
necessary sixty ratifications required for the ICC to come into full operation. See Rome
Statute, supra note 15, at Part 13, art. 126. The States that have thus far ratified the Rome
Statute include: Senegal (Feb. 2, 1999); Trinidad'and Tobago (April 6, 1999); San Marino
(May 13, 1999); Italy (July 26, 1999); and Fiji (Nov. 29, 1999).
92 Leila Sadat Waxier, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal
Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 665, 707 (1996).
93 Cf Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law,
33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 237, 256 (1998) (stating that "the decision to try offenders
domestically, hand them over to an international tribunal, or achieve some other form of
accountability remains with the elites of nation-states, many of whose commitment to
human rights does not now, and may not in the foreseeable future, extend to seeing
themselves or their colleagues placed in the dock.").
94 JONES, supra note 9, at 115.
95 Id.
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Permitting prisoners to be incarcerated in Italy would certainly ease
the distance dilemma for counsel, families and supporters separated
from ICTY prisoners.
Thereafter, Finland penned its agreement with the Court on
May 7, 1997.96 Neither of these agreements apply automatically.97
Rather, the Court will determine the place of ultimate detention based
on a case-by-case basis. It appears that beyond these initial
agreements, both nations must still submit an official request or
reach further agreement with the Court confirming that a particular
defendant is welcome for detention in their State. 98 Such limited
agreements do not provide the ICTY with much actual assistance
as particular defendants may not be desired by any State.99 This
flaw was noted by Judge McDonald who criticized that "[i]f we do
not have enforcement of sentence agreements with States, we can
do nothing with the persons if they are convicted. Nothing. As I
have twenty-three persons in custody and expect ... that we will
have more .. .. That is all fine and well. What do we do if they are
convicted?"' 00
Perhaps responding to the urgent need for "willing states,"
both Norway and Sweden have also agreed to accept Yugoslavian
prisoners.101 Thus, the ICTY may now select between four States
when deciding the locus of final detention.'0 2 Interestingly, each of
the four countries remain confined to the Western European region.
One must question why more States - European, or otherwise -
,have not yet indicated a willingness to accept ICTY and ICTR
prisoners. Do the North American countries feel that their
participation via contributing funds and court personnel (including
96 id.
97 id.
98 Id. (stating that "[t]he Agreement does not apply automatically, however,
but only if Italy agrees to a request from the Registrar that a particular convict be sent to
Italy to serve his sentence ... Like the Agreement with Italy, the Agreement with
Finland does not apply automatically but on a case-by-case basis, following consultations
between the Parties concerning a specific convicted person.").
99 See supra note 11 for a discussion of the reservations by various States.
100 McDonald, supra note 81, at 1436.
101 See generally supra note 83.
102 id.
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judges, prosecutors and defense counsel) absolves them from further
contribution? Is such cooperation sufficient to dispel their burden
under the ICTY and ICTR Statutes? And, where are the Latin
American countries, Australia and the Asian countries?
The globalization of criminal law requires that the
international community in its many varieties forge together to
produce a justice system capable of redressing gross violations of
human rights. A court without complementary bodies, such as a
police unit and prison facilities, to carry out its pronouncements
becomes little more than a symbolic gesture. 10 3 Certainly the legacy
of World War II and its promise of "never again," the victims of
the Balkan tragedies and the Rwandan genocide victims are
deserving of more.
Yet, even the African countries have been reluctant to proffer
the necessary assistance. Only two countries, both located on the
Western Coast of Africa thousands of miles from Rwanda and the
Tribunal, have agreed to accept ICTR prisoners. 10 4  Whatever
concerns regarding proximity to counsel, family and friends and ease
of access exist in relation to the ICTY States are magnified on the
African continent. Travel from Rwanda to the Tribunal in Tanzania is
prohibitively problematic for many individuals. Now, prisoners will
be exported to a distant portion of the continent without the benefit of
sophisticated and frequent travel options. The lack of any structured
response to this continuing void will hamper the evolution of any
ICC; much like it has burdened and crippled the two ad hoc bodies.' °5
Whatever explanation might be accepted or acceptable at this
stage of international legal development, the continued inertia of
United Nations Member States merely mocks the pledge of peace and
103 Ratner, supra note 93, at 256. See also Diane F. Orentlicher, Swapping
Amnesty for Peace and the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 3 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 713 (1997).
104 See ICTR Website, supra note 84.
105 Cf William A. Schabas, Prosecuting International Criminal Justice,
Democracy and Impunity in Post Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to
Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523 (1996); Akhavan, supra note 68, at 332; Richard
Goldstone, Assessing the Work of the United Nations War Crimes Tribunals, 33 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 5 (1997) (describing the ICTY as "a fig leaf for the international community
behind which it could hide its shame for having done so little for the people of the former
Yugoslavia.").
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reconciliation to these war-tom countries. While only four Western
European and two West African States have agreed to accept
international prisoners, an obvious contrast can be drawn between this
level of cooperation mandated by Security Resolution and the level of
cooperation and zeal evidenced by those States eager to participate in
the prosecution and detention of former Chilean General Augusto
Pinochet. 10 6 While none of the current ICTY defendants maintain the
political stature or historical significance of Pinochet, the lack of
commitment to finally bringing these individuals to justice speaks
volumes about the international community's true devotion to the
principle of accountability for gross violations of human rights. The
conspicuous lack of coherent and reliable follow-through in
international criminal law remains a plague that promotes and
reinforces impunity.
V. PAROLE AND COMMUTATION ISSUES
Another crucial element of criminal justice that has thus far
been overlooked in international jurisprudence is the importance of
parole and commutation issues as a principle of sentencing. Of all the
Major War Criminals - both at Nuremberg and Tokyo - only one
came close to fully serving his sentence. 10 7 Many of the remaining
defendants avoided fulfilling their sentence obligations due to the
disbanding of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ambivalence that followed
the initial reaction to their convictions.'
0 8
This failure (to the extent that massive reduction of sentences
and whole-scale parole policies constitutes a failure of criminal
justice) is memorialized in the halls of the Holocaust Museum in
106 See generally BBC website (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.bbc.
co.uk>.
107 Rudolph Hess died in prison at the age of ninety-three (93) when he
committed suicide. This is the only Major War Criminal emanating from either World
War II tribunal that fully served a sentence of life imprisonment. See supra notes 53-57
and accompanying text. The entire group of Tokyo prisoners, both Major War Criminals
and the lesser Class B and Class C defendants, were all released well prior to expiration
of their respective sentences. GINN, supra note 2, at 242.
108 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
576 [Vol. XVI
20001 SPANDA U RE VISITED 577
Washington, D.C.. Visitors here are informed that most of the
individuals responsible for the unspeakable travesties committed
during World War II, particularly by German defendants, were
released prior to the expiration of their actual sentences. The
statement, as it appears, strongly condemns the unsatisfactory
methods used to effectuate widespread parole and commutation of
sentences following World War II.
Because the law of the detaining State will apply to both
issues of detention and issues regarding parole and commutation of
sentences, 1°9 it is vitally important for the modem Tribunals to
consider the question of pardon and commutation of sentences in
establishing a uniform system of detention. Commutation adds yet
one more concern for these Tribunals and the forthcoming ICC in
achieving their stated goals of putting "an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of these [international] crimes and thus contribute to the
prevention of such crimes."' 
10
109 See infra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
110 Rome Statute, supra note 15, at Preamble. This quote is taken directly
from the Preamble of the Rome Statute which reads in its entirety as follows:
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds,
their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and
concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any
time,
Mindful that during this century millions of children,
women and men have been victims of unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace,
security and well-being of the world,
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by
enhancing international cooperation,
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators
of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of
such crimes,
Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes,
Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of
the United Nations, and in particular that all States should
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Article 28 of the ICTY Statue provides that "[i]f, pursuant to
the applicable law of the State in which the convicted person is
imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of
sentence, the State concerned shall notify the International Tribunal
accordingly. The President of the International Tribunal, in
consultation with the judges, shall decide the matter on the basis of
the interests of justice and the general principles of law." ''  The
dependency of this Article and Article 27 of the ICTR Statute' 12 on
State law as opposed to any internationally agreed upon approach to
parole and commutation may lead to inconsistent and varied results.
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations,
Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Statute
shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene in
an armed conflict in the internal affairs of any State,
Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and
future generations, to establish an independent permanent
International Criminal Court in relationship with the United
Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole,
Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court
established under this Statute shall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdiction,
Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for the enforcement
of international justice....
Id.
ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 28 (emphasis added).
112 The language of Article 27 of the ICTR Statute is essentially identical to
that of Article 28 of the ICTY Statute. Article 27 provides as follows:
Pardon or commutation of sentences
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the
convicted person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for
pardon or commutation of sentence, the State concerned
shall notify the International Tribunal for Rwanda
accordingly. There shall only be pardon or commutation of
sentence if the President of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, in consultation with the judges, so decides on the
basis of the interests of justice and the general principles of
law.
ICTR Statute, supra note 14, at art. 27.
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For instance, individuals incarcerated in a federal prison facility in the
United States (were the United States to act as a "willing state" for
receiving international prisoners) would be wholly without resort to
parole as parole is no longer available to federal prisoners in the
United States. As Morris and Scharf note, "[t]his approach could
result in unequal treatment of persons convicted by the International
Tribunal since eligibility for pardon or commutation depends on the
national law of the State where the person is incarcerated. National
laws may vary in this respect."
113
The corresponding ICTY Rules regarding pardon and
commutation of sentence can be found in Rules 123, 124 and 125 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 1 4 Rule 123 provides that "[i]f,
according to the law of the State in which a convicted person is
imprisoned, he is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the
State shall in accordance with Article 28 of the Statute, notify the
Tribunal of such eligibility.""' 5 Rule 124 gives the President of the
ICTY the power to "determine, in consultation with the Judges,
whether pardon or commutation is appropriate." 116 And finally, Rule
125 provides that "[i]n determining whether pardon or commutation is
appropriate, the President shall take into account, inter alia, the
gravity of the crime or crimes for which the prisoner was convicted,
the treatment of similarly-situated prisoners, the prisoner's
demonstration of rehabilitation, as well as any substantial cooperation
of the prisoner with the Prosecutor.
' 17
These rules, erroneously I would suggest, place undue
importance on Tribunal judges in the continuing oversight of parole
matters. Both the ICTY and ICTR remain ad hoc institutions with a
limited mandate, limited resources, and a limited temporal
113 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 24, at 306-07.
114 The corresponding ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence are found at
Rules 124, 125 and 126, respectively. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1 (1995) (entered into force June 29,
1995).
115 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Oct. 6, 1995, U.N.
Doc. IT/32 Rev. 6.
161d.
117 id.
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existence.1 18 The respective Statutes and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence have not yet envisioned an alternative approach to reliance
on the Tribunal judges despite the issuance of three life sentences by
the ICTR 119 and three sentences exceeding twenty years at the
ICTY. 12 ° All of these lengthy sentences and the many that are to
follow, will surely outlast the existence of these temporary
institutions. An immediate need would appear to be the rectification
of this dangling problem. Otherwise, the opportunity for history to
repeat itself via the mass expulsion of war criminals looms ominously
on the not too distant horizon.
One possible solution to the parole and commutation issue
would be for the ICTY and ICTR to immediately establish uniform
guidelines for commutation beyond those stated in Rule 125 of the
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Rule 126 of the ICTR Rules of
Procedure prior to this issue reaching either Tribunal. 121  These
juridical bodies should strive to avoid the appearance that pardon and
commutation are dependant upon the fortuitous location where a
person is ultimately incarcerated by issuing more specific criteria for
parole and commutation of sentences. In this regard, it might be
useful for the Court to analyze the separate commutation statutes of
three of the accepted ICTY States - Italy, Finland and Norway.
Each of these States provides the availability of commutation
of sentence. Finland and Norway provide very generous commutation
provisions, permitting parole to occur after an offender has served
two-thirds of his or her sentence. 122 For first time offenders in both
118 While neither Tribunal Statute delimits an established time frame for their
respective existence, the stated purposes for both institutions is limited to the particular
crises which they address. The ICTR jurisdictional mandate is limited to one year -
including those violations occurring between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. See
generally ICTR Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7 (detailing the territorial and temporal
jurisdiction of the Tribuanl).
119 See generally supra note 2 1.
120 See generally supra note 6.
121 But see MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 24, at 306-07 (suggesting that "the
responsibility entrusted to the International Tribunal to make the final decision as to
pardon or commutation guarantees the necessary uniformity of treatment").
122 Prisoners in Finland are normally granted automatic parole once they
complete two-thirds of their sentence. See Matt Joutsen, Finland, in UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF JUST., WORLD FACTBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS (1997) available at
(visited February 29, 2000) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjfin.txt>.
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Finland and Norway, however, the necessary prison time is generally
reduced to half the imposed sentence. 23 In contrast, Italy provides
that if an offender participates in a re-education program, he or she
may receive forty-five days credit for each six month period spent in
prison.1 24 This system allows a fifteen month reduction in sentence
for each five years served. 125 Because Erdemovic has been sent to
Norway after having served more than two years on a five-year
sentence, the issue of commutation should appear before the Court
within the coming year.
This author recommends the establishment of a uniform parole
and commutation structure that further delineates the requirements set
forth in ICTY Rule 125. Beyond the factors already announced, the
Court should establish a scheduled minimum time period before
which commutation is not available.' 26 Recognizing that a variety of
domestic approaches exist, the Court should establish a rule
permitting the parole or commutation of sentences after at least two
thirds of the announced sentence has been served provided the
prisoner meets certain additional criteria.1
27
Likewise, most Norwegian prisoners are released prior to the expiration of their full
sentence. Most prisoners are released after serving two-thirds of their sentence. See Lee
Bygrave, Norway, in UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUST., WORLD FACTBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS (1997) available at (visited February 29, 2000) <http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjnor.txt>.
123 See sources cited supra note 122.
124 See Mario Biddau & Pietro Marongiu, Italy, in UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
JUST., WORLD FACTBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 25 (1997) available at (visited
February 29, 2000) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjita.txt>.
125 ld.
126 Interestingly, this is precisely what the Tribunal did in the case of Tadic.
The original Sentencing Judgment in the Tadic case explicitly provided that parole or
commutation would be unavailable to Tadic until he had served a full ten (10) years of his
sentence. At the time this judgment was issued, that would have required Tadic to fully
serve one half of his sentence prior to any consideration of parole. This method, if
continued, will ensure some level of consistency between sentences despite the fortuitous
location of imprisonment. Unfortunately, however, the remaining ICTY judgments do
not contain such explicit language relating to parole and commutation. The purpose of
establishing norms would be precisely to avoid the ad hoc nature and treatment of this
crucial issue.
127 This recommendation fully comports with the procedure detailed in
Article 110 of the Rome Statute. Article 110 provides in pertinent part as follows: "When
the person has served two thirds of the sentence, or 25 years in the case of life
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In addition to standard temporal limitations, additional parole
considerations should be explored. First, the future dangerousness of
the individual should be assessed in every case. This issue of future
dangerousness is of particular importance in the case of Yugoslavia
and the ICTY since the Balkan war remains ongoing and atrocities
continue to be committed by the warring factions. A second
consideration should be whether the individual has accepted his or her
respective involvement and guilt, demonstrated remorse and shown a
willingness to contribute to society in a more positive fashion upon
release. Such criteria would assist in the determination of whether a
sentence once announced has proved effective at assisting in the
restoration and maintenance of peace, the initial impetus for the ICTY
and ICTR. As the Tribunal judges are much more intimately involved
with these issues on a daily basis, the Honorable Judges are in a far
superior position than the receiving State to assess the achieved goals
of sentencing. Accordingly, the issue should not be relegated to State
control but should in all respects be addressed by the Tribunals in a
fair and consistent manner.
This emphasis on judicial rather than State control conflicts
with the earlier criticism that the Tribunals have not yet evinced
acknowledgment that these institutions remain merely temporary
judicial bodies. It is at this point that the actual creation of the ICC
becomes pertinent. If the ICC does come into full existence, the
judges of the existing ad hoc bodies could easily relegate the task of
overseeing sentences to this permanent international institution. 128
This author may be unique in suggesting that the ICC is important for
the potential role it can play in enforcing and overseeing ICTY and
ICTR sentences, but as history demonstrates, reliance on other nations
to deal with war criminals results in full scale pardons and imperfect
imprisonment, the Court shall review the sentence to determine whether it should be
reduced. Such a review shall not be conducted before that time." See Rome Statute,
supra note 15, at Part 10, art. 110 (3). As the language of this provision clearly indicates,
the two-thirds review is mandatory. Review must occur after two-thirds of the sentence
has been served and cannot be considered prior to the expiration of that time. Id.
128 See Id. Article 110 unequivocally delegates the task of reviewing
sentences to the judge of the Court. Id. Hence, absorbing the overflow of the ICTY and
ICTR prisoners once the two Tribunals disband will be less burdensome than calling upon
some outside institution or agency. Once the ICC does enter into force, these judges will
become the leading experts in enforcing international criminal law.
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justice. 129
Fortunately, the ICC Statute recognizes the potential for the
disparate enforcement of sentences and accordingly concentrates the
sole power of reducing any sentence with the Court. Article 110 of
the ICC Statute clearly states that "[t]he Court alone shall have the
right to decide any reduction of sentence, and shall rule on the matter
after having heard the person."' 30 In addition, in an effort to avoid
instances, such as the United States example considered above where
parole is not a State-provided option, the Statute mandates that the
Court shall review individual sentences for possible reduction after
"the person has served two thirds of the sentence, or 25 years in the
case of life imprisonment., 131 This ability to reconsider individual
sentences prior to expiration fully comports with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights emphasis on the prison as a
place for rehabilitation. 1
32
VI. AN INTERNATIONAL PRISON
Judge McDonald, the former President of the ICTY, has
expressed grave concern regarding the recalcitrance of individual
States to offer prison facilities under Article 27 of the ICTY
Statute. As she recently noted, "[o]nly six States have commenced
negotiations to reach agreements for the enforcement of sentences
and of those, only [three] have signed agreements, while a further
thirteen States have indicated they are willing to accept convicted
persons . ... The Tribunal has the right to expect more than this
dismal demonstration of support by the vast majority of the
international community. The expectation that we will be
supported and empowered by the international community has
practical, legal and moral underpinnings."'
' 33
129 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
130 Rome Statute, supra note 15, at Part 10, art. 110(2) (emphasis added).
131 id.
132 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 1999
U.N.T.S. 171.
133 McDonald, supra note 81, at 1432-33.
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Perhaps the solution to this dilemma of detention is as simple
as Spandau or Sugamo.' 34 It this author's belief that the international
community should create an international prison wherein supervision,
maintenance and financial responsibility are shared by the entire
international community. With the increasing global awareness of
human rights and the growing support for the ICTY and ICTR, as
embodied by the recent adoption of an ICC Statute and the arrest and
detention of former Chilean General Augusto Pinochet, the time is
ripe for international cooperation regarding imprisonment of war
criminals. To date, the requested cooperation has not been
forthcoming, despite repeated pleas by the Tribunal and Secretary-
General for assistance. The international community needs some
catalyst to spark its interest in funding and facilitating the
imprisonment of war criminals. The Pinochet dilemma may well
provide the appropriate European vehicle.
Although many European States have been reluctant to
become involved in the task of incarcerating ICTY and ICTR
prisoners, the fervent support demonstrated over the mere possibility
of trying General Pinochet indicates more than a passing interest in
rectifying gross violations of human rights.135  Perhaps the
Yugoslavian conflict is simply "too European" or the currently
detained individuals less renown than General Pinochet. Whatever
the reason, stated or implicit, the fact remains that Spain, Great Britain
and other European powers have yet to act with such outrage against
ICTY and ICTR defendants. But, too, this may have something to do
with the fact that, as of the time of this writing, General Pinochet
remains under house arrest and has not actually required maintenance
in a British prison facility. It is hard to understand the intricate
reasons underlying the virulent response to the Pinochet episode.
Nonetheless, Europe is moving (at least in this one example) in the
direction of enforcing international criminal law. And, without proper
enforcement mechanisms, the continued indictment, arrest and trials
of ICTY and ICTR defendants conflicts with the international
community's stated belief that impunity must cease.
To meet the growing need for enforcement in international
134 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
135 See generally supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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criminal law, we should investigate the feasibility of establishing an
international prison system whereby the international community
participates in detention either directly through providing physical
resources (such as the prison facilities offered by Italy, Finland,
Norway, Sweden, Mali and Benin), labor forces (such as guards,
interpreters, educators, medical personnel and other necessary
employees), or indirectly by offering financial resources to
successfully enable the Tribunals to fulfill their respective mandate.
Such proposal conveys a certain level of optimism by this author as
the need for a prison facility will become increasingly acute with the
creation of a permanent ICC. The proximity of Italy to the Balkan
conflict, and its willingness to accept at least certain prisoners, makes
Italy a prime candidate for hosting at least one such facility.
36
Further, the ICTY has already accepted Italy as a potential host-State,
thereby acknowledging its suitability to enforce international
sentences. 137
While this proposal may seem premature, visionary or
otherwise unpalatable, it has potential. More importantly, it has the
authority of history. An international prison system could possess a
single detention unit, such as Spandau or Sugamo, or maintain
regional detention facilities with centralized staff and regulations.
There are many nations (such as the United States) that maintain a
national prison system with regional facilities. The advantage an
international system offers is considerable. For instance, an
international prison system would ensure: (1) that each international
prisoner has a prison cell available upon conviction; (2) that prisoners
would be housed with similar offenders posing similar security risks;
(3) that prisoners would be subjected to standard rules and regulations
regarding confinement, and, ultimately, a uniform system for
commutation; and, (4) perhaps most importantly, that prisoners and
the international community would perceive a sense of permanence.
The fifty-year gap between war crimes tribunals may be
136 In addition, the recent ratification of the Rome Statute by Italy
demonstrates its commitment to enforcing international criminal law. See supra note 91.
Italy is the only major European country to have ratified the Rome Statute and/or to have
agreed to accept ICTY prisoners. Id.
137 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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credited less to the absence of war crimes or conflicts rising to the
level of international magnitude and more to the reality that trying war
criminals remains a tedious and expensive task. The judicial
machinery constructed by the United Nations Security Council has
cost the world community millions of dollars. And, this expense does
not even begin to reflect the cost of imprisonment for the numerous
individuals that have been (and will be) convicted by the ICTY and
ICTR and who will remain in criminal custody for many years to
come. A permanent facility can help control costs and provide a place
certain for incarcerating the next group of defendants emanating from
the future equivalents to Cambodia, the Philippines, Iraq,
Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leon and Indonesia. The very point of
an international criminal court is to establish a permanent institution
capable of addressing gross violations of human rights.
Further, a single prison system requires familiarization with
only one set of domestic (or internationally established) laws and
regulations and should permit prisoners to be surrounded with others
who speak their native language and understand their culture since
most wars generate much more than an individual defendant. 138
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the consideration
that a single prison system would make the transition to control by an
outside source or agency much easier if the concentration of prisoners
is focused in only one area or a small number of areas.139 One should
not lose sight of the fact that the ICTY and ICTR are simply ad hoc
bodies. Both institutions are limited tribunals with a finite operating
period. To spread these prisoners throughout the world with
sentences ranging from five years to possible life imprisonment will
require some organization or body to constantly familiarize itself with
domestic laws in each of the host countries. The job of overseeing
these universal prisoners will become terribly laborious once the two
ad hoc Tribunals are dismantled. And, while the ICC might step into
138 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
139 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 24, at 308 (stating that "[a]fter the
International Tribunal has completed its mandate with respect to the crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia, responsibility for making decisions as to pardon or commutation
could be transferred to another international body, such as the European Court of Human
Rights or a special committee of the United Nations Human Rights Commission. This is
one of the questions that will need to be addressed at that time by the Security Council").
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a supervisory role once this vision becomes a functioning reality,
there is no assurance that the ICC will ever garner the necessary
number of signatures for ratification. In over twenty months since the
ICC Statute was adopted, only five States have ratified the
document. 140 Fifty-five additional ratifications are required before we
can begin relying on the ICC for any improvement in international
law.14 1 To the extent an international prison system proves
unworkable, the international community must begin considering
alternative ways to secure the enforcement of sentences. The growing
number of ICTY and ICTR convictions and the continued inertia of
the international community under the current system mandates a
change in approach. The future of international criminal law and the
viability of the ICC may well depend on an appropriate solution being
reached.
VII. THE DUTY TO PUNISH
Were international scholars and activists to be completely
candid, we would proclaim that punishment, not prosecution, is a
failed concept in international law. There are numerous treaties and
covenants that require prosecution. 142  One of the most classic and
unequivocal examples can be found in the Genocide Convention,
adopted by the international community in 1948 and entered into force
in 1951.143 The Genocide Convention mandates that persons charged
with genocide "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in
the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction." 144 Yet, there has still been
140 See supra note 91.
141 Rome Statute, supra note 15, at Part 13, art. 126. Article 126 of the Rome
Statute requires that sixty States ratify the Statute to bring the ICC into force.
142 See generally Mary M. Penrose, Impunity: Inertia, Inaction and Invalidity,
A Literature Review (1999) (working paper completed for and on file with the Asia
Foundation). Several of the cited conventions and treaties include: the Genocide
Convention; the Convention against Torture; the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; the Geneva Conventions of 1949; and various regional instruments. Id.
143 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 1951 A.T.S. 2 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
144 Id. at art. 6.
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no action against any of the individuals responsible for the Cambodian
genocide. 145  Rather, Cambodia stands today as one of the most
conspicuous political failures of the post-World War II era.
Beyond the failures noted in Cambodia, one can point to the
numerous instances in Latin America where persons responsible for
gross violations of human rights were explicitly granted immunity or
have been permitted to avoid prosecution due to the fragility of
developing democracies. 146  In response to the wave of impunity
experienced between 1960 and 1990, Professor Diane Orentlicher
published a groundbreaking article entitled "Settling Accounts: The
Duty to Prosecute." 147 This convincing article solidified the collective
conscience of many international scholars in suggesting that there is
an obligation - both legally and morally - to prosecute those
individuals responsible for committing gross violations of human
rights. Yet, despite the popularity of Professor Orentlicher's article
and the frequent citation to this piece, there is noticeable inertia
regarding the duty to punish.
The distinct treatment of the duty to prosecute and the duty to
punish goes far beyond a matter of semantics. 148  The modem
consensus seems to be that there is indeed a duty to prosecute. But, as
this current article demonstrates, the level of agreement seems less
obvious when dealing with the duty to punish. What value is
145 See Penrose, supra note 142.
146 See generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (for a thorough and varied
approach to the transitional choices made by various Latin American countries following
their respective transitions to democracy).
147 Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations ofa Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
148 Black's Law Dictionary provides the literal definitions for punishment and
prosecution. The term "prosecute" is defined as follows: "[t]o follow up; to carry on an
action or other judicial proceeding; to proceed against a person criminally. To 'prosecute'
an action is not merely to commence it, but includes following it to an ultimate
conclusion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990). Similarly, "prosecution" is
explained as "[a] criminal action; a proceeding instituted and carried on by due course of
law, before a competent tribunal, for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of
a person charged with a crime." Id. In subtle contrast, the term "punishment" is defined
as "[a]ny fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the law
and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or offense committed by him, or
for his omission of a duty enjoined by law." Id. at 1234.
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prosecution when the issue of punishment remains unresolved? To
create an international criminal court without the power to arrest or
lacking the legitimate threat of imprisonment does little to quell
international violence. A fundamental concept of criminology is that
it is not the severity of punishment that deters, but rather, that the
certainty of some form of punishment that precludes the commission
of crime.' 49
Despite the presence of two International Tribunals and the
proclamation supporting a permanent international criminal court,
there continues to be massive structured killings in several parts of the
world. In fact, the clearest evidence of the impotency of these
Tribunals to curb violence can be found in the former Yugoslavia
itself where war defiantly continues.' The threat of prosecution is
clearly less formidable than the threat of punishment. 151 Punishment,
as enforced in full measure by the international community, could
truly avert such crises as those experienced in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia.
Perhaps it is time for the international community to tackle a
much graver problem than the duty to prosecute. Now that scholars
and activists have reached an acceptable level of agreement regarding
prosecution, perhaps it is time to start honestly considering the duty to
punish. And, as set forth above, punishment will entail much greater
cooperation than that which has thus far occurred. The duty to punish
will require that the United Nations and its Member States pledge
their continued support in creating an effective criminal justice
149 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, AND OTHER WRITINGS
63 (Richard Bellamy ed., 1995) (reminding that "[t]he certainty of even a mild
punishment will make a bigger impression than the fear of a more awful one which is
united to hope of not being punished at all").
150 War with Milosevic, THE ECONOMIST, April 3, 1999 (explaining that in
April, 1999, figures regarding Kosovo indicated as many as one million refugees may
have been displaced during the Serbian-led ethnic cleansing efforts of March and April,
1999). This overflow resulted in NATO bombings outside the purview (and without the
sanction) of the United Nations Security Council. See Press Release, Security Council
Rejects Demand for Cessation of the use of Force Against Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, (United Nations) SC/6659, 3989th mtg., March 26, 1999.
151 See Press Release, supra note 150 (describing that at one point, the
refugees were pouring over the Albanian, Macedonian and Montenegro borders at a rate
of 4,000 per hour). The mass exodus of Kosovar Albanians suggests that the ICTY has
had little impact on at least certain areas of the Yugoslavian conflict.
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system. The more than six year presence of two criminal tribunals has
done little to quash international violence. A criminal court without a
complementary police force and prison facility is simply inadequate.
Such design falls well short of the perceived duty to punish and the
proclaimed duty to prosecute. Punishment via criminal prosecutions
requires dedication to all aspects of criminal justice.
At this point, punishment requires a collective commitment by
the international community that those individuals convicted by our
international criminal bodies will be placed in penal institutions
capable of carrying out the pronounced sentences. The pledge of a
mere six States cannot adequately reach this goal. Rather, let the duty
to prosecute serve as the first exchange in a continuing conversation.
Let us move beyond the mere duty to prosecute and venture further
into the duty to punish.
CONCLUSION
Despite the predication by Professor Michael Scharf that
proximity to the former Yugoslavia might be a basis for detention
considerations, the first ICTY sentence will be served by Drazen
Erdemovic in Norway. 152 This decision is somewhat puzzling when
one considers that Italy, one of the closest countries to the former
Yugoslavia, was thefirst country to agree to accept ICTY prisoners.153
One commentator suggests that Host States need to be determined
prior to the rendering of any judgments so as to avoid the appearance
of political judgments. As set forth above, however, the list of
"willing states" is confined to four Western European and two West
African countries.1 54  This remains true despite the blossoming
success of the ICTY and ICTR in bringing modern-day war criminals
to justice. This remains true despite the recent adoption of the Rome
Statute by a majority of the United Nations Member States.
Drazen Erdemovic. He is the first. He has served over three
152 See ICTY Website, supra note 85.
153 See Ratner, supra note 93.
154 Though four States currently exist for detention purposes, only three were
available at the time Erdemovic's sentenced was confirmed on appeal. See supra notes
10-13 and accompanying text.
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years of his five-year sentence. Under the rules of Norway, he may be
released at any time now - pending final approval from the ICTY
judges. His case will be pivotal in establishing a precedent for the
enforcement of international criminal sentences. For this reason, it is
imperative that the ICTY, the ICTR and the UN work together to
establish rules and procedures governing the possibility of a standard
procedure on the commutation of individual sentences. The Court has
perhaps erred in waiting this long - some six years following its
inception - to address the unique and pressing issues of detention.
It is also time for the international community to offer its
assistance under Chapter VII to maintain and/or restore peace to the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda by assisting the ICTY and ICTR,
respectively, with the issue of detention. The current options are
severely limited. "The issue, therefore, is not whether those in
custody are convicted or acquitted. Instead, with respect to the
indictments issued to date, there are currently no means for the
enforcement of more than a small number of sentences. It is folly to
defer action on this matter until such time as we are presented with a
situation that we cannot address because of lack of incarceration
facilities."'' 55
Drazen Erdemovic. He is the first individual to be condemned
by a modern war crimes tribunal. By no means will he be the last.' 5
6
The time for determining detention issues is now. The legacy of
international criminal law may well depend upon it. The authority of
the ICC requires it. Complacency by "willing states" can no longer be
ignored or accepted. We are definitely at the crossroads: is it merely
that international law decrees a duty to prosecute or are we actually
moving beyond this point toward a true duty to punish? At present,
our actions belie our words.
155 McDonald, supra note 81, at 1433.
156 See supra notes 6-21 and accompanying text.
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